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Abstract. Location-based services are increasingly used in our daily
activities. In current services, users however have to give up their location
privacy in order to acquire the service.
The literature features a large number of contributions which aim at
enhancing user privacy in location-based services. Most of these contri-
butions obfuscate the locations of users using spatial and/or temporal
cloaking in order to provide k-anonymity. Although such schemes can
indeed strengthen the location privacy of users, they often decrease the
service quality and do not necessarily prevent the possible tracking of
user movements (i.e., direction, trajectory, velocity). With the rise of
Geofencing applications, tracking of movements becomes more evident
since, in these settings, the service provider is not only requesting a sin-
gle location of the user, but requires the movement vectors of users to
determine whether the user has entered/exited a Geofence of interest.
In this paper, we propose a novel solution, PrivLoc, which enables the
privacy-preserving outsourcing of Geofencing and location-based services
to the cloud without leaking any meaningful information about the lo-
cation, trajectory, and velocity of the users. Notably, PrivLoc enables an
efficient and privacy-preserving intersection of movement vectors with
any polygon of interest, leveraging functionality from existing Geofenc-
ing services or spatial databases. We analyze the security and privacy
provisions of PrivLoc and we evaluate the performance of our scheme
by means of implementation. Our results show that the performance
overhead introduced by PrivLoc can be largely tolerated in realistic de-
ployment settings.
1 Introduction
Location-based services (e.g., Foursquare [1] and Yelp [5]) are gaining increas-
ing importance recently. Several applications enable users (e.g., using mobile
devices) to discover and communicate their locations to a server in the cloud;
in turn, the server uses this information to return data relevant at the users’
locations. For instance, a number of existing services can only be acquired by
users who are located within a specific geographical area; these include banking
services, Youtube, and content delivery services, among many others. Location
information also proves to be useful for a number of security-critical services
such as police investigations, e-voting, etc.
However, while many devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets) are capable of dis-
covering and reporting their locations, a considerable number of users shy away
from reporting their locations in the fear of being tracked or profiled by ser-
vice providers [7]. This problem is even more evident when the service provider
wishes to outsource his spatial services to the cloud (e.g., [4]). Service providers
have considerable incentives to rely on hosted services in the cloud, since this
enables them to maximize the availability of the service while minimizing the
costs for acquisition of hardware and operation. Indeed, the cloud offers a low
barrier for small and medium enterprises to offer location-based services and
enables its clients to avoid huge upfront investments to accommodate for peak
usage. However, hosting the spatial service in the cloud raises serious privacy
concerns with respect to the leakage of client location information to the cloud
provider.
The literature comprises a plethora of contributions which strengthen the
privacy of users in location-based services. Most of these contributions focus on
anonymizing user locations by means of a trusted location anonymizer server [6,
15,20,22,34]. After registering with the service, users can send their exact loca-
tions to the server, which “blurs” these location reports and sends the cloaked lo-
cation to a remote database server. The server also filters the database’s response
and subsequently sends the exact answers back to the users when needed. Ex-
isting location anonymization techniques can be categorized according to three
different approaches: (i) inserting false dummies [21], where the server sends
n location updates for each location reported by the user ((n − 1) reports of
which are dummy), (ii) location blurring [6, 10, 15, 20, 33] where the location of
the user is blurred into a spatial area (using spatial or temporal cloaking), and
(iii) landmark obfuscation [19] where the server sends the location of a near-by
landmark instead of the location of the user.
While these techniques can provide users with k-anonymity guarantees, ex-
isting techniques (i) often require changes to the database server in order to
efficiently process the anonymized queries, or (ii) reduce the accuracy of the
location-based service (e.g., when relying on spatial cloaking), or (iii) do not
prevent location tracking [22]. Location tracking could be performed e.g., by
inferring the direction of the movement/path followed by the user, the veloc-
ity of the user, etc., which might de-anonymize users. Such information leakage
is particularity damaging in location-based services where service providers are
interested in the events of users entering/exiting a given area (e.g., Geofencing
applications [2, 3, 23, 28, 29]). These applications are gaining increasing impor-
tance for e.g., targeted advertisements, and typically take as inputs vectors of
movements performed by users and enable service providers to extract various
statistics about their customers, such as visit durations, start, end, etc.
In this paper, we address this problem, and we propose a novel solution,
PrivLoc, which efficiently enables the privacy-preserving use of Geofencing ser-
vices in the cloud without incurring any modifications to spatial indexing tech-
niques, and without leaking any meaningful information about the location, tra-
jectory, and/or velocity of the users to the cloud provider. More specifically, we
consider a typical Geofencing setting, whereby a spatial database hosted on the
cloud receives regular movement vectors from users, and checks if these move-
ments cross a Geofenced area which has been subscribed to within the database.
If so, the provider issues a notification informing the appropriate subscriber that
a user has exited/entered the subscribed area of interest. Note that this can be
achieved in existing spatial databases by querying for intersection between the
user movement vector and the Geofenced area. PrivLoc leverages the presence of
a private trusted service which performs efficient specially-crafted transforma-
tions of location reports to interface with the cloud-hosted Geofencing service
without exposing the privacy of users. As such, PrivLoc can be used by compa-
nies and individuals to prevent information leakage towards spatial databases
hosted in clouds, such as Google, Amazon, etc. In this respect, PrivLoc enables a
privacy-preserving intersection of movement vectors with any polygon of inter-
est, while leveraging functionality from existing cloud-based spatial databases.
We analyze the security and privacy provisions of PrivLoc and we evaluate its
performance in a realistic setting. Our results show that our scheme scales well
with the number of users and subscriptions in the system and does not incur
considerable computational overhead on the trusted server.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline
our system and adversarial model. In Section 3, we introduce and analyze our
solution, PrivLoc, which efficiently enables users to acquire privacy-preserving
Geofencing services hosted in the cloud. We evaluate its performance by means
of an implementation in Section 4. In Section 5, we overview related work in the
area, and we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Model
In this section, we describe our system and adversarial model, and we outline
the security requirements that our solution should satisfy.
2.1 Spatial Databases
Spatial databases are instances of databases optimized to store and query data
which represents objects defined in a geometric space. Examples of spatial databases
include MongoDB, MySQL, PostgreSQL, among others. To efficiently handle and
store spatial data, spatial databases rely on a Spatial Database Management
System (SDBMS) which extends upon the capabilities of a traditional database
management system. SDBMS typically supports three types of queries: (i) set
operators (e.g., disjoint, touch, contains), (ii) spatial analysis (e.g., distance, in-
tersection), and (iii) other basic functions such as envelope, boundary, etc. This
is efficiently achieved through the reliance on spatial indices (e.g., R-tree, X-tree,
GiST). For instance, R-trees [18] represent objects with their minimum bound-
ing rectangle in the next higher level of the tree. The main intuition here is that
a query which does not intersect the bounding rectangle also cannot intersect
any of the contained objects.
While there are a number of spatial indexing techniques, all techniques re-
quire the database server to check a series of coordinate equalities and inequal-
ities in order to determine its spatial index. This clearly poses a problem when
dealing with encrypted data objects. For instance, standard encryption of the
coordinate system with a semantically secure cryptosystem such as AES, would
not preserve any relationship (i.e., to check for equality/inequality) between two
points in the coordinate system. While this would be ideal from a cryptographic
point of view, it would not be useful for spatial databases, since no “efficient”
indexing would be possible on objects.
2.2 System Model
We consider the following system: we assume the existence of mobile nodes M
(e.g., mobile devices, sensors) which “publish” periodic location reports to a Ge-
ofencing service that is hosted in the cloud and consists of multiple database
servers. In the sequel, we denote by Di the i-th database server; for clarity of
presentation, we also denote by D the “logical” database comprising the various
database servers. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume a 2D
bounded area where the nodes can freely move. Each node Mi ∈ M periodi-
cally sends location beacons to the database servers. These beacons consist of
tuples of the form 〈IDi,Loci〉, where IDi is an identifier of Mi, Loci is a vec-
tor of the last movement performed by Mi (e.g., Loc could comprise the last
and the current coordinates of Mi). We assume that the movement of node Mi
is characterized by a velocity distribution Vi, and a path distribution Pi. For
simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the movement of Mi
between two reported coordinates corresponds to a straight line. Current Ge-
ofencing applications require indeed that nodes report their last and the current
coordinates; by doing so, the Geofencing server can be a stateless server which
does not memorize the last coordinate of each node. As we show in this paper,
this also serves to increase the privacy of the entire system.
We assume that D offers location-based services to customers, denoted in
the sequel by S. Here, we assume that customers can “subscribe” to events that
occur within a specific sub-area of the map for instance, customers want to be
notified when users enter/exit their subscribed Geofences.
In the sequel, we denote by Si the ith subscriber in S; upon receiving a
location report from node Mi, D checks if Mi’s reported coordinates are located
within a subscribed area. More specifically, D relies on existing spatial database
functionality which can efficiently compute the intersection between a line and
polygons. If the movement vector of a node results in non-empty intersection, D
issues a notification message to Sk (e.g., using a URL of Sk stored at D).
2.3 Adversarial Model and Security Requirements
Throughout our analysis, we assume that the nodes are trusted to report their
locations correctly. That is, we assume that these devices cannot be compromised
by the adversary. Moreover, we assume that the cloud providers (operating the
database servers) are honest-but-curious. More specifically, we assume that each
database server will correctly follow the protocol (i.e., authenticate the nodes,
output correct notifications) but is interested in acquiring information about the
locations of the nodes in the system, and about the queries that are issued by
the customers. Ideally, different database servers do not collude; this assumption
especially holds when the database servers are hosted by different clouds (e.g.,
Amazon, Google). Moreover, we assume that the adversary cannot physically
track the mobile users to acquire information about their movements. Finally, we
assume that the adversary is computationally bounded (i.e., she cannot acquire
secrets, break secure encryption functions, etc.).
As mentioned earlier, the main premise behind our work is to design a
privacy-preserving solution for a Geofencing service hosted in the cloud, without
incurring any modifications on the database servers, and while ensuring that
D does not learn any meaningful information about the location of the users
and subscriptions in the system. Since the adversary can compromise a database
server, we can express these security properties using the following requirements:
Requirement 1—Confidentiality of Stored Records: Each database server
should not learn any meaningful information about the stored subscriptions.
This can be ensured if the transcript of interaction between D, M, and S is
(computationally) independent of the actual subscription coordinates.
Requirement 2—Confidentiality of Queries: Similar to Requirement (1),
each database server should not learn any meaningful information about the
location of the nodes. This includes the direction of the movement, the trajectory
taken by each node, the distance travelled by each node, etc.
Recall that both Requirements (1) and (2) should be achieved without com-
promising the functionality of the database server, i.e., while enabling efficient
geo-spatial indexing, search over encrypted data, etc. (cf. Section 2.1).
Note that both Requirements (1) and (2) can only ensure confidentiality
of the input/output, but do not prevent the possible correlation between the
inputs and outputs of the database when subject to location queries by the
nodes. This is the case since D can learn whether a given publish event matches
an encrypted subscribe event. In this work, we do not aim at preventing such
information leakage. As far as we are aware, the literature features a number
of solutions for this problem. These include delaying some queries to ensure k-
anonymity [17,31,32], relying on bogus queries/subscription to probabilistically
provide input/output unlinkability [21], among many others.
3 PrivLoc: Privacy-preserving Outsourced Geofencing
Services
In this section, we introduce PrivLoc, our solution which enables the privacy-
preserving outsourcing of Geofencing services to the cloud and we thoroughly
analyze its security and privacy provisions.
3.1 Overview of PrivLoc
PrivLoc requires that D only implements the standard Geofencing functionality
specified in Section 2.1 without any modification, given inputs from the mobile
users. Thus, we see D as a Geofencing service hosted in the cloud. Nevertheless,
PrivLoc ensures that no meaningful information about the location of the devices
and subscriptions in the system is leaked to any entity, including D.
In order to achieve these goals, PrivLoc relies on a trusted server T , which
mediates the exchange of information between the devices/subscribers on one
side, and D on the other side. More specifically, T translates both the mobile
device locations, and the subscriptions into “scrambled” inputs that are then
stored and processed by D. Although the inputs are subsequently hidden from
D, PrivLoc ensures that they can be processed using existing geo-spatial indexing
algorithms and always result in a correct database lookup. More specifically, the
various operations undergone in PrivLoc are:
– Upon receiving each subscription request, T translates the subscription re-
quested by the subscribers into the appropriate coordinates and stores them
at D.
– Upon receiving each sensor location beacon, T translates the location into
the appropriate coordinates and only forwards the transformed beacon to D.
We see T as an additional service which is run locally to prevent information
leakage towards spatial database servers hosted in clouds, such as Google, Ama-
zon, etc. Clearly, for our solution to be effective, the overhead on T should be
minimal. Indeed, in PrivLoc, T simply has to apply a series of transformations
on the received subscriptions and location reports. We stress at this point that
the role of T can be emulated by the mobile nodes and the subscribers them-
selves, in case these entities pre-share keys. Otherwise, the presence of a trusted
service which orchestrates the key management among users and subscribers of
the database is required (see [6, 10, 15, 20, 33] for similar assumptions).
PrivLoc introduces two granularity levels when encrypting locations. On the
coarse-granular level, PrivLoc relies on a pseudo-random permutation to emulate
a strong encryption function, while on the fine-granular level PrivLoc relies on a
weaker notion—order-preserving encryption—to preserve the relative location of
closely-related points within a sub-area—referred to as tiles —so that the spatial
operations performed by D can be applied within each tile without modification.
As we describe in Section 3.2, PrivLoc relies on multiple database servers to
ensure that any two consecutive location reports can be fitted to at least one
tile. The combination of our techniques ensure that location reports pertaining
to each tile can be processed using existing functionality of D, without revealing
the location or direction of movements. In the following paragraphs, we discuss in
details the various translation operations and the load incurred by T in PrivLoc.
3.2 PrivLoc: Protocol Specification
PrivLoc unfolds as follows. T first proceeds to dividing the original map by a
regular grid into fixed-size square tiles. For privacy reasons, the area covered by
κ the security parameter, e.g. 128 bit
L the width and height of a tile
m the number of tiles in a column, i.e. the height of the map
n the number of tiles in a row, i.e. the width of the map
Table 1. Global system parameters of PrivLoc.
a tile should fall above a given threshold. In the sequel, we assume the global
system parameters shown in Table 1. Furthermore, PrivLoc makes use of the
following functions:
– a pseudorandom function PRF : K × {0, 1}∗ × ℓ → {0, 1}ℓ , which can be
realized by a HMAC construction.
– a pseudorandom permutation PRP : K × {0, 1}N → {0, 1}N ,
where N = ⌈log2(nm)⌉. Exemplary PRP constructions can be found in [8].
In the setup phase, T generates key k as a uniformly random bit string of a
length depending on the intended security level κ.
As mentioned earlier, PrivLoc requires that T encrypts the coordinates re-
ported by devices before transmitting them to D. Besides hiding location in-
formation, one important goal here is to hide the fine-grained user movements
(i.e., direction and distance of movement). Recall that, in our setting, the sub-
scribers are interested in knowing whether a device has crossed a Geofence. For
the database servers to determine that, it is therefore necessary for them to be
able to compare the relative coordinates between the origin and the destination
of every sensor movement segment along with the boundaries of Geofences (or
subscriptions).
PrivLoc achieves the aforementioned goals by dividing the map into tiles and
distorting the original coordinate system into three different variant maps (for
the reasoning why, see following paragraphs). By doing so, PrivLoc encrypts the
location of each tile within the maps, but ensures that every received location
report can be fitted to at least one full tile in one of the maps. Subscriptions
that cross more than one tile are also subsequently split to several smaller Ge-
ofences that are completely contained in a single tile. Within that tile, PrivLoc
further distorts the direction and distance of the user movement while enabling
the spatial database to find all intersections between the movement vector and
translated Geofences in the distorted tile using existing indexing techniques.
More specifically, PrivLoc applies the encrypt procedure (Algorithm 1); en-
crypt takes as input real world coordinates (x, y) and transforms them into ob-
fuscated coordinates (newx , newy). encrypt is executed on (i) movement vectors
to translate the movement end-points, and on (ii) subscriptions to translate the
south-west, and the north-east coordinates that define the minimum bounding
box of each Geofence.
The algorithm encrypt consists of four main routines:
– permuteTiles is used to divide the map into equal-sized tiles and permute
these tiles. By doing so, permuteTiles hides the location of the devices within
the map.
Algorithm 1 Coordinate Encryption in PrivLoc
Require: Coordinates x, y, map offset z, master key k
Ensure: Encrypted location newx , newy
1: procedure encrypt(x, y, z, k)
2: (Num, dx, dy)← coordinatesOnTile(x, y, z)
3: Num ← PRP(k ; n ×m;Num)
4: (dx, dy)← rotateTile(dx, dy,Num , k)
5: (dx, dy)← flipTile(dx, dy,Num, k)
6: (dx, dy)← OPE(dx, dy,Num, k)
7: newx ← (Num modn)× L+ dx
8: newy ← (Num div n)× L+ dy
9: return newx , newy
10: end procedure
– rotateTile and flipTile are used to rotate and flip each tile in the distorted
map. Both routines serve to hide the direction of devices’ movements within
the original map.
– OPE is used to hide the distance between any two locations within each tile.
Here, permuteTiles, rotateTile, and flipTile hide the location and direction of
the movement of each device from D, while OPE distorts the distances within
each tile. All four routines, however, enable D to rely on existing indexing tech-
niques (c.f. Section 2.1) to compare different locations within each tile.
Hiding Movements within a Tile
Recall that PrivLoc operates on movement vectors reported by the users. Upon
receiving the vector from devices, T encrypts the vector, by applying the encrypt
procedure in Algorithm 1, to both the start and end-point of the movement
vector. These points are represented by 2D coordinates (x, y). The encryption
function invokes the procedure coordinatesOnTile, which returns the tile number
Num of the tile where the point (x, y) lies on, and the relative coordinates (dx, dy)
on the respective tile. As the map is split in n ×m tiles, we have Num ∈ Zn×m .
This coordinate translation is achieved by means of Algorithm 2.
As the first step of hiding the location of these points within the map, T
permutes the tiles using the key k by applying the pseudorandom function:
PRP(k ; n × m;Num). Note that k is only held by the trusted server T . This
function computes a pseudorandom permutation of the numbers in Zn×m and
outputs the new position Num for the tile T .
To further hide the linkability between two consecutive location reports (i.e.,
to prevent leakage of movement information), T first rotates each tile using
rotateTile (rotation chosen at random among 0, π/2, π, 3π/4), and then (in-
dividually) flips them using flipTile, in order to obfuscate the direction of the
movement. Both operations result in a transformation entropy of three bits per
tile. When combined with permuteTile, this results in a total of 3⌊log2(nm)⌋ bits
of entropy per tile.
Algorithm 2 Coordinate Translation
Require: Coordinates x, y and offset z of the respective map
Ensure: Num of the tile where x, y lies and relative coordinates dx, dy on the
tile
1: procedure coordinatesOnTile(x, y)
2: x0← (x− z mod L×m) div L
3: y0← (y − z mod L× n) div L
4: Num ← (x0 + y0 · n)
5: (dx, dy)← x mod L, y mod L
6: return(x0, y0, dx, dy)
7: end procedure
Algorithm 3 Tile Flipping
Require: Coordinates dx, dy and Num
Ensure: Coordinates dx, dy after flipping the tile
1: procedure flipTile(x, y, k)
2: flip ← PRF(k ; “flip”, Num; 1)
3: if thenflip = ‘1′
4: dx′ ← (L− 1)− dx
5: end if
6: return(dx′, dy)
7: end procedure
rotateTile is described in Appendix A. rotateTile takes the output of per-
muteTile; the position of the tile T is not changed in this algorithm. The rotation
angle of T is determined using the key-based pseudo-random function PRF.
T then applies tile flipping (Algorithm 3). Given the outputs of rotateTile,
flipTile outputs the newly flipped coordinates (newx , newy). Note that flipTile is
analogous to rotateTile, except that the coordinates are transformed by a mirror
matrix.
In order to hide the distances of movements executed by devices, PrivLoc
further relies on the use of order-preserving encryption (OPE) within each tile.
Order-preserving encryption has the property that the relative order among
coordinates is preserved after encryption. That is, let OPE(p) denote the order-
preserving encryption of plaintext p. Then, the following holds:{
OPE(p1) ≤ OPE(p2) ifp1 ≤ p2,
OPE(p1) > OPE(p2) ifp1 > p2.
Hiding Cross-Tile Movements
Clearly, encrypt can only hide the trajectory, and distance exhibited by location
reports from D when they fall within the same tile. However, if two consecutive
location reports cross the boundary of a single tile and are matched to different
tiles, then (i) D cannot compare the relative location advertised by these re-
ports and (ii) D might be able to guess that these tiles correspond to physically
connected tiles in the original map.
Thus, a query for a movement which crosses the tile boundary must be
avoided in PrivLoc. To achieve that, PrivLoc relies on more than one tiling of
the same map (see Figure 1); although a movement might cross the boundary
of one map tiling, PrivLoc ensures that there is at least one tiling, in which the
movement falls completely within a single tile. Here, by different map tilings, we
refer to slightly shifted variants of the original map, which have been processed
(i.e., using the encrypt routine) by means of different keys (cf. Figure 1). As
shown in Figure 1, the maximum magnitude of a movement vector that PrivLoc
accepts is bounded by l = t/3 + ǫ, where t is the length of one tile. Thus, all
vectors with magnitude d(x, y) < r = t/3 can be located within one complete
tile stored at least on one of the three servers. Within that tile, this enables the
comparison between all closely located points x and y, where d(x, y) < t/3, while
ensuring that the movement from location x to y does not cross the tile1. An
example of a map with three tilings is depicted in Figure 1. As shown in Figure 1,
we point out that relying on two tilings of the same map is not enough. This is
the case since there exist movement vectors which can still cross two different
tiles in any two map tilings. However, it is easy to show that given three shifted
tilings of the same map, there is no point where all boundaries intersect, thus
ensuring that every movement can be fitted to one tile pertaining to at least
one tiling. This is exactly why PrivLoc requires the presence of three database
servers D1, D2, and D3, which store subscriptions pertaining to the three map
tilings.
All received subscriptions are stored encrypted with three different keys k1,
k2 and k3 on all three servers respectively. Whenever T receives a location report,
it will choose to query the database server Di, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} for whom this report
falls in a full tile (see Appendix B for the algorithm). Here, T can efficiently
find out which server to query for each movement (by essentially performing two
integer divisions, cf. Section 4).
As a by-product, we point out that the reliance on multiple database servers
in our scheme inherently achieves load balancing of the load on the servers and
increases the load capacity of the entire system. This is the case since T only
queries one server for each received location report.
Encrypting Subscriptions
We now proceed to describing how T encrypts subscriptions and stores them at
the database servers D. Clearly, for D to be able to use existing functionality to
compute the intersections of the movements with subscriptions, the subscriptions
must be encrypted using the same routine that is used to process the location
reports.
More specifically, T uses the encrypt routine to encrypt the north-east and
the south-west coordinates which define the minimum bounding box for each
subscription. This is done using the three keys k1, k2, and k3, respectively. The
1 Thus, this ensures that an adversary who can observe consecutive movements cannot
acquire information about the relative position of the actual tiles in each transformed
map.
Fig. 1. Example of three tilings of the original map. Notice here that the movement
vector crosses the boundaries of tiles in “Map 1” (shown in solid lines) and “Map 2”
(shown in dotted lines) but can be fitted complexity within a tile in “Map 3” (shown
in dashed lines).
resulting encrypted coordinates are stored in database servers D1, D2, and D3
(see Figure 2). Here, T must ensure that:
– In case a subscription crosses the boundaries of tiles for the map tiling at
a database server, the subscription needs to be split into parts, that each
completely fit within one tile of the corresponding map tiling. This process
has to be repeated for each of the three servers independently. While this
incurs additional storage overhead per server to store the tiles, we show in
Section 4 that the storage blowup incurred by PrivLoc can be, to a large
extent, tolerated in realistic settings.
– T batches the upload of k¯ subscriptions to the three database servers. Here,
k¯ denotes a desired privacy threshold. As we show later, this ensures that
database servers cannot temporally correlate various subscriptions.
3.3 Security Analysis
Before analyzing the security of PrivLoc, we capture Requirements (1) and (2)
(cf. Section 2.3) using the following security game, PrivA, which involves a p.p.t
adversary A and a challenger C. In our game, C simulates location reports and
subscription requests and emulates the role of the trusted server T which inter-
acts with D. More specifically, the PrivA game unfolds as follows.
Setup. The challenger C sets up 3 database serversD1, D2 andD3 and generates
the respective master keys k1, k2 and k3 using the setup routine.
Run. The challenger C simulates location reports and subscriptions. More specif-
ically, C simulates the presence of N nodes with distribution (V , P), and S
Fig. 2. Exemplary run of PrivLoc with four different movements. Each path displayed
in (a) consists of 20 movement reports, each of a length of 30% of the tile width. We
depict the snapshots seen by database servers D1, D2, and D3 in (b), (c) and (d),
respectively. Note that the marking of the vectors in (b)-(d) is only for visualisation,
since different location reports cannot be linked by the database.
subscriptions. On input a location report (x, y), C executes chooseServer and
encrypt(x, y, k).
Compromise. A chooses one server DAi , i ∈ {1, 2, 3} at time t. Starting from
time t, A acquires a trace consisting of all inputs and outputs to/from DAi .
Challenge. A then chooses a location report r that arrived at t˜ > t and sends
r as a challenge to C.
Response. Upon reception of r, C locates the node Mk which issued r, and
randomly flips a bit b. If b = 0, then C sends to A a trajectory of movement
vectors followed by node Mk. Otherwise, if b = 1, C creates a randomly
generated trajectory comprising of movement vectors derived from the dis-
tributions Vk and Pk.
We define the advantage of A in the above game PrivA by:
AdvPrivA = Prob[b
′ ← A : b = b′]
Definition 1. Location Tracking
We say that a system prevents ǫ-tracking if AdvPrivA =
1
2
+ ǫ.
Clearly, a system perfectly prevents location tracking when ǫ is negligible.
Definition 1 captures Requirements (1) and (2) in Section 2.3. Here, A can
compromise one database server. After observing the transcript of interactions
with the compromised server, our goal is to preventA from acquiring information
about the trajectory followed by any node Mk of her choice. This is captured by
the fact that the probability that A can distinguish the trajectory adopted by
Mk from any random path is negligible. Notice that Priv
A captures the ability
of the adversary to infer information about the trajectory taken by users using
side-information like the velocity of movement, the distance traveled, etc.
Security Analysis: We informally analyze the security of our scheme with
respect to the aforementioned PrivA game.
Notably, our goal is to show that an adversary A which compromises one
database server Di and has access to the inputs/outputs of Di cannot acquire
meaningful information about the trajectory of users. Recall that the commu-
nication between users, subscribers, and T is performed over confidential and
authenticated channels, which does not give A any advantage in acquiring in-
formation about the (plaintext) location reports and the subscriptions in the
system.
In analyzing the advantage of A in PrivA, two cases emerge:
1) Analyzing single location reports: Having received an encrypted loca-
tion vector from T , we note that A cannot infer the location of the corre-
sponding user whom generated it in the original map. This is the case since
the keyed PRP used in the permuteTiles function ensures that the adversary
cannot guess the actual location of the tile which hosts the report in the
original map. Moreover, OPE ensures that A cannot acquire the actual dis-
tance travelled by the user while the keyed tile rotation and flipping ensure
that A cannot guess the direction of the user movement given the received
location vector.
2) Correlating two or more location reports: Recall that Di will only re-
ceive location reports which correspond to a complete tile given the tiling
hosted by Di. As mentioned earlier, the combined use of the permuted tile
location of the report, the OPE-obfuscated distance travelled by the user,
and tilted/rotated movement direction does not offer any distinguisher for
A to correlate two or more location reports.
Similarly, it is easy to show that A cannot acquire any meaningful informa-
tion about the subscriptions in the system. Note that when tiling and permuting
tiles at each server, each subscription might be split into a number of smaller sub-
scriptions within each tile. However, assuming that the system hosts a number
of subscriptions, this does not give any advantage to A in inferring information
about the subscriptions. Note, here, that A can acquire considerable informa-
tion as T populates Di. For instance, it is straightforward for A to guess with
high probability that consecutive subscriptions in Di correspond to the same
actual subscription which was subsequently split by T to prevent subscriptions
from crossing tile borders. This is exactly why PrivLoc requires that T batches
the processing of k¯ (genuine) subscriptions at a time. On one hand, this en-
hances the anonymity of the subscriptions, and on the other hand, this prevents
A from correlating stored encrypted subscriptions (e.g., map them to the same
subscription) and acquiring information about the tile permutation.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, PrivLoc can only ensure confidentiality of the in-
put/output, and does not prevent the correlation among the inputs and outputs
of Di. That is, A can learn whether a given location report has triggered a re-
sponse from Di and therefore corresponds to a user entering/exiting a Geofence.
The literature features a number of solutions for this problem (see [17,21,31,32]).
4 Implementation & Evaluation
In this section, we implement PrivLoc and we evaluate the performance of our
implementation in comparison to the setting where the Geofencing service is not
outsourced to the cloud, but is locally offered using an existing spatial database.
4.1 Implementation Setup
We implement the PrivLoc service using Java. In our implementation, we set
κ = 128, we adapt the OPE from [9], and we use HMAC-SHA1 as the PRF
in the rotateTile and flipTile routines. The tile permutation is achieved by an
array permutation given a secure random number generator. In our setup, we
deploy PrivLoc on an 8-core Intel Xeon E3-1230 with 16 GB RAM; the various
clients issuing location reports and/or subscriptions were co-located with T on
the same machine.
We chose a square 100km × 100km map in which the maximum size of a
subscription is 100m× 100m (this was also the tile size in our implementation).
Conforming with Section 3.2, we set the maximum movement distance of a user
between two consecutive location reports to t
3
≈ 30m. We rely on the random
waypoint model to simulate node mobility. More specifically, for each user in the
system, we assume a random initial location in the map; for each subsequent
movement, the movement vector angle is chosen randomly from [0,360] degrees,
while the distance of each movement is chosen randomly from [0,30] meters.
Throughout our evaluation, we assume a realistic setting where the ratio of
location reports to incoming subscription requests is 19:1.2
Based on this setup, we measure the throughput achieved by PrivLoc with
respect to the average latency incurred on T due to a location report or a
subscription. To increase the load on T , we vary the number of concurrent clients
from 1 to a maximum of 256. In our experiments, we are interested in assessing
the performance of PrivLoc when the links between T and the database servers
are not the bottleneck. For that purpose, we short-circuit the database servers
and we abstract away the time to upload the location reports by T to the
database servers. Under these settings, we compare the throughput and latency
achieved by PrivLoc to the traditional case where the spatial database is entirely
hosted locally; here, we compare the performance of PrivLoc to (i) a stand-
alone MySQL spatial database (with R-tree indexing) and (ii) a PostgreSQL
database (with GiST indexing). Both databases were deployed within our 8-core
Intel Xeon E3-1230 with 16 GB RAM; we report their performance with different
subscription table sizes (i.e., initial number of records).We also evaluated PrivLoc
when compared to MongoDB. Since the performance exhibited MongoDB was
far inferior to that of MySQL and PostgreSQL, we omit these measurements
from our evaluation.
2 We conducted experiments where the ration between where location reports and
subscriptions is 1:1. Our results were similar to the setting featuring a ratio of 19:1.
4.2 Evaluation Results
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Fig. 3. Comparison between PrivLoc and
local MySQL and PostgreSQL databases.
We start by evaluating the per-
formance of PrivLoc w.r.t. to the
MySQL and PostgreSQL databases
while varying the initial number of
stored subscriptions. This experiment
captures the performance of PrivLoc
compared to locally hosted spatial
databases as the number of subscrip-
tion populating these databases in-
creases with time. For that purpose,
we measure the peak throughout (PT)
exhibited by PrivLoc and compare it with that of MySQL, and PostgreSQL re-
spectively, in settings where the initial number of stored subscriptions varies
from 1,000 to 1,000,000. Our results are depicted in Figure 3. Our findings show
that the PT of PrivLoc is superior to MySQL when processing location reports,
irrespective of the number of stored subscriptions. Here, PrivLoc outperforms
PostgreSQL as the number of subscriptions stored by the PostgreSQL database
increases beyond 50,000 records. This is also the case when processing sub-
scription requests. Nevertheless, our results indicate that, even when the initial
number of subscriptions stored in the MySQL, and PostgreSQL databases is as
low as 1,000, the relative PT achieved by PrivLoc can be easily tolerated.
In a second experiment, we evaluate the relative performance of PrivLoc in
the realistic case where the Geofencing service has been running for some time,
and has accumulated the subscriptions from a large number of subscribers. To
simulate this case, we insert 1,000,000 subscription records in the databases.
Figure 4 depicts the latency incurred in PrivLoc for the processing of location
reports and subscriptions in the system with respect to the achieved through-
put (measured in the number of 1000 operations per second). For comparison
purposes, we also include the performance achieved by a local MySQL and a
PostgreSQL spatial database in the same setup. Our results (cf. Figure 4(a))
show that PrivLoc is at least twice faster than locally processing location reports
on both spatial databases. Moreover, the peak throughput achieved in PrivLoc
is more than 2 times higher than that achieved by the MySQL and PostgreSQL
databases. However, our results in Figure 4(b) show that the latency and peak
throughput achieved by PrivLoc are modest when inserting subscriptions, com-
pared to the local MySQL database. This is due to the blow-up in the number of
subscriptions. Notably, since T splits the map into small tiles, a subscribed area
might be further split by T if it crosses multiple tiles. Note that each subscribed
area results in an average of 6.75 subscribed areas which will be encrypted by
PrivLoc and pushed to the n = 3 database servers. This blow-up is dependent on
the number of database servers, and the size of the subscribed area with respect
to the size of the tiles. More specifically, the average area of a subscription in our
setup is 1/4 of the area of a tile; this means that the average number of partitions
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Fig. 4. Throughput and latency in PrivLoc. Here, we assume a subscription table size
of 1,000,0000 records. Each data point in our measurements is averaged over 10 inde-
pendent measurements; we present the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
of a subscribed area on each database server is Np = 1 ·
1
4
+ 2 · 2
4
+ 4 · 1
4
= 2.25.
The total blowup in terms of subscriptions is subsequently 3Np = 6.75.
In spite of the storage blowup, our findings nevertheless show that PrivLoc
considerably outperforms a local PostgreSQL database.
5 Related Work
In what follows, we briefly overview existing contributions in the area. In [7],
Barkkuus and Dey show that users were concerned about the ability of services
to track them.
Most privacy-enhancing solutions for location-based services rely on a trusted
“location anonymizer” service which hides the location of users. These services
either provide k-anonymity [13, 17, 26, 31, 32] or spatial/temporal cloaking with
an area of interest [6,10,15,20,33]. A number of solutions rely on inserting fake
queries in order to prevent a database server from learning the actual location
reports (e.g., [21]). While these solutions provide k-anonymity, they incur sig-
nificant additional costs on the database server. Other solutions rely on location
perturbation/obfuscation; these solutions map the location reports to a set of
pre-defined landmarks [19] or blur the user location into a spatial area using
linear transformations [6, 15, 20, 22, 34] Such solutions indeed hide the location
of users but might affect the accuracy of the location-based service. Moreover,
these solutions can only hide the location of a user, but do not aim at hiding
the user movement.
To prevent location tracking, Gruteser and Liu [16] propose disclosure con-
trol algorithms which hide users’ positions in sensitive areas and withhold path
information that indicates which areas they have visited. Other schemes rely
on Private Information Retrieval (PIR) algorithms in order to enable privacy-
preserving queries in spatial databases [14, 24]. PIR schemes allow a querier to
retrieve information from a database server without revealing what is actually
being retrieved from the server. However, these solutions are computationally
intensive and require modifications to the database server in order to process
the blurred location queries.
In [25], Pfitzmann et al. define unlinkability and privacy in pseudonymous
systems. Dwork [12] define differential privacy and quantify information leakage
from the query access of individuals. In [30], Shokri et al. quantify location
privacy using the error of the adversarial estimate from the ground truth. In [11,
27], various entropy-based metrics are introduced to assess the communication
privacy in anonymous networks.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel solution, PrivLoc, which enables privacy-
preserving outsourcing of location-based services to the cloud without leaking
any meaningful information to the cloud provider. PrivLoc goes one step beyond
existing solutions in the area and targets Geofencing services where users send
a vector of their movements for the service provider to detect whether a user
has crossed a given Geofence. We analyze the security and provisions of PrivLoc
and show that PrivLoc does not leak information about the location, movement,
trajectory, and/or velocity of the users to the Geofencing database. Our evalua-
tion of PrivLoc shows that the overhead incurred by our solution can be largely
tolerated in realistic deployment settings.
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A Tile Rotation in PrivLoc
Require: Coordinates dx, dy and Num
Ensure: Coordinates dx, dy after rotating the tile
1: procedure rotateTile(x, y, k)
2: rotation ← PRF(k ; “rotate”, Num; 2)
3: if rotation = ‘00’ then
4: dx′ ← dx
5: dy′ ← dy
6: else if rotation = ‘01′ then
7: dx′ ← dy
8: dy′ ← (L− 1)− dx
9: else if rotation = ‘10′ then
10: dx′ ← (L− 1)− dx
11: dy′ ← (L− 1)− dy
12: else if rotation = ‘11′ then
13: dx′ ← (L− 1)− dy
14: dy′ ← dx
15: end if
16: return (dx′, dy′)
17: end procedure
B Querying the appropriate database server in PrivLoc
Require: Coordinates x0, y0 and x1, y1 describing a movement
Ensure: Server where x0, y0 and x1, y1 are on the same tile or ⊥
1: procedure chooseServer(x, y)
2: for all Di, zi with i = 1, 2, 3 do ⊲ Server D with tile offset z
3: nx← (x0− zi mod L×m) div L
4: ny ← (y0− zi mod L× n) div L
5: Num0 ← (nx+ ny · n)
6: nx← (x1− zi mod L×m) div L
7: ny ← (y1− zi mod L× n) div L
8: Num1 ← (nx+ ny · n)
9: if Num0 = Num1 then
10: return i
11: end if
12: end for
13: return ⊥
14: end procedure
